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BB kami-conflict-detection

Detect physical conflicts (fighting, shoving, scuffling) between 2+ people from one or many RTSP camera streams concurrently. Continuous mode: a single Python process monitors every configured camera in parallel, pushes a per-camera alert (stdout / inbox file / Feishu / Discord / Telegram) on each detected event, and keeps running — it does NOT exit on detection.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: KamiVision v2.0.4 MIT-0 7 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 314 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 73/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers

AnalyzerDiscordTelegramInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
73/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host setup.sh:44
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host setup.sh:46
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      wget -qO- https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url conflict_detector_last.py:659
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendPhoto"
      vendor-hostquoted
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url conflict_detector_last.py:671
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"
      vendor-hostquoted
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:277
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      4. Click **Copy Webhook URL** (format: `https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123456/abcdef...`)
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:297
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      - Or call `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates` after sending a message in the group → find `"chat":{"id":-100xxxxx}` in the response
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:309
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      --discord_webhook https://discord.com/api/webhooks/... \
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 73/100

    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4314 tokens
    • 100Steps. 36 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 365: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill appears purpose-built for conflict detection, but it needs Review because it handles sensitive camera footage and includes under-scoped public image upload and installer supply-chain risks.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jun 2026