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BC layered-memory-sys

分层记忆系统 v2.4.1 — 6层架构的智能记忆管理。支持分层TTL管理、梦境模式（自动巩固/归档/遗忘/合并）、TF-IDF搜索、导入导出、全功能管理面板（搜索/批量操作/编辑/梦境触发）、自动备份、Docker一键部署。适用于AI Agent需要长期记忆、分层管理、自动遗忘和知识提取的场景。触发词：记忆、分层、梦境、导入导出、归档、备份

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 141553 v2.4.1 MIT-0 41 files · 1 script body ≈ 971 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDockerInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:30
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)
    echo "  curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh"
    code literalvendor-host
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process install.sh:125
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable layered-memory
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege install.sh:130
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "    手动: sudo cp /tmp/layered-memory.service /etc/systemd/system/"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process install.sh:136
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup node scripts/start-api.mjs > /tmp/layered-memory.log 2>&1 &
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:57
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-j+gKEx…ahh+s1F2HZ+wAce…RkU++ZWQr…uoQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:110
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…rvP+yUUf…4tH/iSSo…tEA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:138
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+qIYR…PQd+PJGi…oLv+RhT3…mNQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:215
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Wwy+ghLE…vfU/YnxW…fdg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:355
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FSj+bWLt…2sH/Kn8E…h6w==",
    detector

Files scanned: 41. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 48 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 971 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -227 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -36 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 172: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 48 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This memory skill is purpose-aligned, but it needs Review because it can read conversation logs, persist or delete memory data, and expose unauthenticated local API/WebSocket services.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026