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AD ecc-bundle-2026-07-08

ECC essentials bundle - install 23 core skills (agentic-engineering, security-review, deployment-patterns, docker-patterns, git-workflow, search-first, safety-guard) in one shot. Use when user asks to install ECC essentials, bootstrap OpenClaw with extended capabilities, or set up a full ECC workflow bundle.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 18816478335q-pixel v1.0.2 MIT-0 26 files body ≈ 818 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege bundle/safety-guard.md:33
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      - chmod 777
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege bundle/safety-guard.md:34
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      - sudo rm
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security bundle/security-scan.md:101
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      1. **Attacker (Red Team)** — finds attack vectors

    Files scanned: 26. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "emoji"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (ecc-bundle-2026-07-08) differs from the folder (eccsystem)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 818 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 309: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a developer-agent workflow bundle, but it changes agent/project state and encourages several high-impact actions without consistently clear consent, scoping, or safety gates.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 10 Jul 2026