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DC yt-dlp

A robust CLI wrapper for yt-dlp to download videos, playlists, and audio from YouTube and thousands of other sites. Supports format selection, quality control, metadata embedding, and cookie authentication.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: azzar budiyanto v1.0.1 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 586 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationYouTubeMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
48/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
26
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/guide.md:204
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser chrome "URL"
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/usage.md:192
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser chrome "URL"
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:60
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    scripts/download.sh "URL" --cookies-from-browser chrome
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/guide.md:60
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo curl -L https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/latest/download/yt-dlp -o /usr/local/bin/yt-dlp
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/guide.md:61
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod a+rx /usr/local/bin/yt-dlp
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/usage.md:58
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo curl -L https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/latest/download/yt-dlp -o /usr/local/bin/yt-dlp
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/usage.md:59
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod a+rx /usr/local/bin/yt-dlp

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 586 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 206: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 2)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a straightforward yt-dlp wrapper; its main sensitive feature is optional browser-cookie use, which is relevant to the purpose and partly disclosed.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026