DC llm-proxy
(no description)
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
-
high Dangerous commands
cmd-destructive-fsscripts/content-filter-rules.json:18Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed)":(){ :|:& };:",code literal
Medium and low: 4
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-disable-securityscripts/llm-proxy-config.json:16Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (string literal in code, not executed)"iptables -F",
code literal -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-disable-securityscripts/llm-proxy.py:68Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (string literal in code, not executed)"iptables -F",
code literal -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/llm-proxy-config.json:21Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)"chmod 777",
code literal -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/llm-proxy.py:73Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)"chmod 777",
code literal
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 37 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 568 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -32 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 26 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 37 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.