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DF wechat-publisher-skill

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: 403914291 v2.0.2 MIT-0 13 files body ≈ 944 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 30/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: docs/block_layout.md

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
48/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
30/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: docs/block_layout.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token docs/install-guide.md:57
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    ? Enter your 公众号 AppSecret: 44c1…454
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token docs/install-guide.md:285
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    app_secret: 44c1…454
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass docs/troubleshooting.md:153
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ~/.openclaw/workspace/memory/wech…ps1
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token docs/troubleshooting.md:261
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    $AppSecret = "44c1…454"

Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: docs/block_layout.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 30/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: docs/block_layout.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: docs/block_layout.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Steps. 41 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 944 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -233 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 7)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill does the WeChat publishing it advertises, but it teaches unsafe handling of account secrets for a high-impact publishing integration.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026