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FD li-emergency-response-mod

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Terry S Fisher v1.0.0 MIT-0 50 files body ≈ 2 177 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

本 Skill 支持两种模式： 1. 单智能体模式：传统AI助手模式，适合个人使用和快速响应

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
38/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
63
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 13

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 13
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence playbooks/Linux应急响应现场手册.md:84
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `/etc/crontab`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence playbooks/Linux应急响应现场手册.md:85
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `/etc/cron.d/*`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence playbooks/Windows应急响应现场手册.md:97
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence playbooks/Windows应急响应现场手册.md:98
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence playbooks/Windows应急响应现场手册.md:99
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence playbooks/Windows应急响应现场手册.md:100
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security IMPROVEMENT_ROADMAP.md:181
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "勒索": [r"\.encrypted", r"勒索信", r"ransomware"],
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README_Deutsch.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **Traditionelle IT** | Mining, Ransomware, Brute-Force, Phishing | Einzel/Multi |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README_Español.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **TI Tradicional** | Minería, ransomware, fuerza bruta, phishing | Único/Multi |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README_Français.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **IT Traditionnel** | Minage, ransomware, force brute, phishing | Unique/Multi |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README_Português.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **TI Tradicional** | Mineração, ransomware, força bruta, phishing | Único/Multi |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:26
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - 🔍 **Comprehensive Coverage**: Traditional IT (mining/ransomware/brute-force/phishing) + AI infrastructure (model poisoning/GPU mining)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:36
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **Traditional IT** | Mining, ransomware, brute-force, phishing, tunneling, database events | Single/Multi-agent |

Files scanned: 50. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 89 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2177 tokens
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 38 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 89 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +3All 5 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is mostly an incident-response guide, but it bundles directly usable offensive persistence, payload, and tunnel instructions that warrant human review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 24 Jul 2026