SKILLEMALL.ai

DB li_maestro_evaluate

Interactive Q&A Threat Modeling — conversational CSA MAESTRO risk assessment for agentic AI systems AND OpenCode Skills (.md/.docx/.xlsx), with AI risk classification mapping to 《人工智能安全治理框架》2.0. Supports two analysis modes: MVTM Checklist (minimum viable threat model with Chinese regulatory extensions) and Full 10-phase assessment. | 基于CSA MAESTRO框架的交互式问答威胁建模评估,面向智能体AI系统及OpenCode Skill,输出多格式(.md/.docx/.xlsx)风险评估报告及AI安全风险分类对照表。支持MVTM检查表与全面评估两种模式。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Terry S Fisher v1.0.3 MIT-0 9 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 35 602 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Interactive Q&A Threat Modeling — conversational CSA MAESTRO risk assessment for agentic AI systems AND OpenCode Skills (.md/.docx/.xlsx), with AI risk…

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, consistency, execution cost

AnalyzerWordExcelAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
51
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Execution cost w 6
10
When it triggers w 12
20
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:1777
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | Can multiple installed skills produce harmful emergent behavior when activated together? | SK-C1 | A2A Communication, Autonomy | Individual skills pass review but their combined prompt+tool access c

A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 35602 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 35602 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (li_maestro_evaluate) differs from the folder (li-maestro-evaluate)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 123 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 35 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
  • -217 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 449: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 138 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 123 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (57 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 51.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a disclosed threat-modeling workflow that writes local reports and uses optional document-generation scripts, with no artifact-backed exfiltration, deception, or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 2 Jul 2026