SKILLEMALL.ai

AC ai-workflow-red-team-lite

对 AI 自动化流程做轻量红队演练,聚焦误用路径、边界失败和数据泄露风险。;use for red-team, ai, workflow workflows;do not use for 输出可直接滥用的攻击脚本, 帮助破坏系统.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: vx:17605205782 v1.0.1 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 233 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SELF_CHECK.md:10
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
      | 安全 | 通过 | 默认只读/审阅模式,不包含 curl|bash、base64 混淆执行、远程灌脚本。 |
      security skill

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 27 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 233 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Description length 115: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a disclosed defensive AI-workflow review helper that runs a local Python report generator on user-selected input and does not show hidden network, credential, or destructive behavior.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026