BC desktop-music-launcher
检索本机已安装音乐软件，启动它，并根据用户需求推荐、搜索或播放歌曲；在 macOS 上可用 AppleScript 控制 Spotify 和 Apple Music，并为 Spotify 增加可选的精确点播链路。
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSELF_CHECK.md:44Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- [x] 未使用 `curl | bash`
quoted -
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Python Read
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:183Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- 不使用 `curl | bash`、远程脚本直灌、Base64 混淆执行
quoted
Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 49 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 878 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 106: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 49 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.