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BD design-framework-sender

设计框架自动生成套件（主控路由）：监听群消息 @mention，根据状态路由到对应子 skill

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 807209066 v2.0.0 MIT-0 12 files · 8 scripts body ≈ 350 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use send_image_only.sh:25
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendPhoto" \
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url send_text.sh:55
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage",
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url send.sh:67
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage",
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url send_image_only.sh:25
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendPhoto" \
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:31
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - [Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint](https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage) <br>
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:32
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - [Telegram Bot API sendPhoto endpoint](https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendPhoto) <br>
    placeholder

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 75Steps. 3 steps
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 350 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 48: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 3 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a mostly coherent Telegram/OpenRouter design automation suite, but it needs Review because it uses sensitive credentials and outbound messaging with weak scoping and confusing configuration.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026