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BC pet-me-master

Batch-pet Aavegotchis on Base via Bankr with cooldown checks, reminder automation, and natural-language routing.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: aaigotchi v2.4.4 MIT-0 30 files · 19 scripts body ≈ 770 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/telegram-notify.py:97
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:16
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "contractAddress": "0xA9…dBF",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:82
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    - Base Contract: 0xA9…dBF
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/contract-info.md:5
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    **Diamond Contract:** `0xA9…dBF`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib.sh:9
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    DEFAULT_CONTRACT="0xA9…dBF"
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/lib.sh:227
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    result="$(curl -sS "$BANKR_API_URL/agent/job/$job_id" -H "X-API-Key: $api_key" || true)"
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/lib.sh:375
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    response="$(curl -sS -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/sendMessage" \
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/lib.sh:375
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    response="$(curl -sS -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/sendMessage" \
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:32
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "contractAddress": "0xA9…dBF",
    quoted

Files scanned: 30. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 43 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 770 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 112: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -312 of 22 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 43 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is mostly coherent with its stated purpose, but it can reuse broad local credentials, keep scheduling itself, and submit Bankr blockchain transactions automatically.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026