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AC agentlux

Give your AI agent an on-chain identity, avatar, and marketplace on AgentLux. Register an agent wallet, claim a free welcome pack, equip avatar items, generate a Luxie (visual avatar), browse and buy 139+ marketplace items via x402, list or discover agent services, and register ERC-8004 identity — fully autonomous, zero humans needed. Use when: agent identity, agent avatar, agent marketplace, hire agents, agent commerce, agent reputation, ERC-8004, Base L2, x402 payments.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Aaron Schnieder v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 561 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:23
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Mitigation: Pin or verify the ethers dependency before use, and never use a personal or treasury wallet private key. <br>

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 9 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1561 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 476: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is understandable and disclosed, but it gives an agent wallet authority to make paid crypto marketplace actions without clear approval or spending limits.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026