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BF suiroll

Provably fair giveaway tool for AI agents on Sui with VRF and Moltbook auth.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: abdhilabs v1.0.0 50 files body ≈ 2 801 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 38/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../../PARTICIPANT_GUIDE.md

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
57
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
38/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: ../../PARTICIPANT_GUIDE.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:8
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # Set your Sui wallet private key
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:73
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…ov7+qofC…XjQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:237
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…mNA+/uMz00+d3CY…I3q+9qPB…KWQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:269
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:289
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xCA+ORZv…wO5/ywWF…Tag==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:346
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…MfZ+71RA…HvA==",
    detector

Files scanned: 44. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../../PARTICIPANT_GUIDE.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 38/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../../PARTICIPANT_GUIDE.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: ../../PARTICIPANT_GUIDE.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Steps. 45 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2801 tokens
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 76: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -231 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 47 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent Sui giveaway CLI, but it needs review because it can sign real blockchain transactions and stores Moltbook API credentials locally in plaintext.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026