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FC openclaw-watchdog

Self-healing monitoring system for OpenClaw gateway. Auto-detects failures, fixes crashes, and sends Telegram alerts.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Abdullah AlRashoudi v1.3.0 14 files · 1 script body ≈ 918 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
24/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 14

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/troubleshooting.md:44
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.watchdog.plist  # Stop
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/troubleshooting.md:45
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.watchdog.plist    # Start
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/troubleshooting.md:62
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.watchdog.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/troubleshooting.md:63
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    rm ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.watchdog.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:138
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$PLIST"
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:95
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.watchdog.plist 2>/dev/null
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:96
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    rm -f ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.watchdog.plist
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:116
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.watchdog.plist"
    code literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/troubleshooting.md:21
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    1. Verify bot token: `curl https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getMe`
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/troubleshooting.md:22
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    2. Verify chat ID: `curl https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates`
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/test-message.py:28
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (test fixture / example file; the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage',
    fixturevendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/validate.py:18
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    resp = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/getMe').read())
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/watchdog.py:100
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:35
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    2. **Your Telegram Chat ID** — Send `/start` to your bot, then visit `https://api.telegram.org/bot<YOUR_TOKEN>/getUpdates` to find your chat ID
    placeholder

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 918 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 117: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -31 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This watchdog mostly matches its monitoring purpose, but it installs a persistent service, handles secrets, sends diagnostics to Telegram, and can perform high-impact recovery actions with weak safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026