SKILLEMALL.ai

CC maxxit-0g

Maxxit trading powered by 0G decentralized AI compute for portfolio-aware trade decisions and 0G decentralized storage for censorship-resistant alpha listings. Includes all DEX trading, market research, copy-trading, and alpha marketplace workflows from maxxit-lazy-trading.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: abhi152003 v0.0.1 MIT-0 11 files body ≈ 24 229 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, execution cost

ProcedureInfrastructureCommercetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
72/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
73
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key breakout-strategy.py:18
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key mean-reversion-strategy.py:18
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key strategy_common.py:15
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key taker-strategy.py:18
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key vwap-strategy.py:19
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:2014
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "login_url": "https://kite.zerodha.com/connect/login?api_key=…&v=3&redirect_params=…",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:2014
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "login_url": "https://kite.zerodha.com/connect/login?api_key=…&v=3&redirect_params=…",
    quoted

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 24229 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "emoji"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "disableModelInvocation"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 24229 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 85Steps. 107 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 24 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 274: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 107 items
  • +4Has examples (117 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a powerful live-trading skill whose core purpose is disclosed, but it has under-scoped financial authority and automation risks that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026