BB cardano-transactions
Sign and submit Cardano transactions with explicit user confirmation.
As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsreferences/concepts.md:9Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetThe wallet holds private keys derived from the seed phrase. Signing attaches a cryptographic witness proving the wallet owner authorized the transaction. The seed phrase is never exposed to the AI age
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsskill-card.md:24Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetRisk: The connected wallet environment depends on a seed phrase. <br>
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsskill-card.md:25Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetMitigation: Keep seed phrases outside the agent context and avoid using a primary wallet or high-value seed phrase. <br>
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 220 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 69: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.