SKILLEMALL.ai

AC breed-two-agents

How do I breed two agents into a better one? Can two OpenClaw agents have offspring? Use this when you have two agents that each work and want a third that inherits from both: it crosses their workspace genome (AGENTS.md, SOUL.md, TOOLS.md, IDENTITY.md, skills, model) with seeded uniform crossover and blending, applies one mutation, keeps a pedigree with Wright's inbreeding lock, and verifies the child against both parents on held-out tasks with a paired comparison, Wilson bounds and an A/A null test. Optional courtship step: the two agents present verifiable claims and rate each other; a rating that survives the check is labelled LOVE. Returns exactly KEEP, DISCARD or UNDECIDED. Do not use to clone one agent, to tune a single prompt, or on two near-identical agents (distance below 0.15).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: aeneassoft v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 788 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 13 d ago

How do I breed two agents into a better one?

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
98/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
94
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1788 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 799: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 94.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly coherent with its agent-breeding purpose, but it includes high-impact execution paths that can expose agents to prompt injection and may allow command injection from inherited workspace data.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 21 Sept 2026