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AB github-repo-browser-read-only

GitHub Repo Browser - Read Only: Read-only GitHub access for agents. Use when an agent needs github repo browser read only, github repo browser read only, browse your private github repositories from a chat agent, explore any public repository's folder structure and source files, read readme files and documentation from any repo, search for code patterns across your repositories or any public project, download repo to storage, owner through AgentPMT-hosted remote tool calls.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: AgentPMT v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 4 415 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

GitHub Repo Browser - Read Only: Read-only GitHub access for agents.

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureGitHubAI and agentsSoftware developmentWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 0. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 27 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4415 tokens
    • 100Steps. 122 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 479: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 122 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly coherent for read-only GitHub browsing, but it can copy private repository files or archives into external storage and return signed URLs without clearly documenting retention or access controls.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · 24 Jun 2026