SKILLEMALL.ai

AC figshare-skill

Use whenever the user wants to interact with Figshare - searching public datasets/articles, downloading Figshare files, listing their own articles/collections/projects, creating or updating articles, or uploading files (including large multi-part uploads) via the Figshare v2 REST API. Trigger on mentions of "figshare", figshare DOIs (10.6084/m9.figshare.*), figshare.com URLs, or phrases like "upload my dataset to figshare", "publish to figshare", "get figshare article".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Agents365.ai v0.1.0 MIT-0 7 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 1 606 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:64
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: token $FIGSHARE_TOKEN" \

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1606 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 474: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
    • +3All 3 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is a mostly transparent Figshare integration, but it needs review because it can publish or upload account content and its downloader writes remote-provided filenames locally without sanitization.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026