SKILLEMALL.ai

FD universal-autostart

Cross-platform auto-start service manager for Windows and macOS. Supports installing, uninstalling, starting, stopping, and monitoring services with automatic restart. Use when you need to set up persistent background services that survive system reboots on Windows (sc/schtasks) or macOS (launchd).

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: steam2001 v1.0.0 MIT-0 11 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 850 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
39/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key publish_textonly.py:13
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    SKILLHUB_API_KEY = "sk-s…etC"
    quoted
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:411
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo python universal_service.py install my_config.json
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence universal_service.py:301
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (code comment)
    # 系统级:/Library/LaunchDaemons/
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence universal_service.py:302
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (code comment)
    # 用户级:~/Library/LaunchAgents/
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence universal_service.py:303
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    plist_dir = Path(f"/Users/{username}/Library/LaunchAgents/")
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence universal_service.py:399
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    plist_path = Path(f"/Users/{username}/Library/LaunchAgents/{service_name}.plist")
    code literal
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token publish_textonly.py:13
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    SKILLHUB_API_KEY = "sk-s…etC"
    quoted

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1850 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -221 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 299: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 33 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its autostart-service purpose, but it includes high-impact persistence behavior plus an unrelated publisher script that can upload local skill files using a hardcoded API key.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026