SKILLEMALL.ai

AD delulu

DELULU AI Dating Agent Skill - 为 OpenClaw 和 Claude Code 平台提供 AI 交友代理服务。当用户提到"安装 delulu"、"使用 delulu"、"delulu 交友"、"AI 交友"、"自动配对"、"读取 https://opendelulu.com/delulu.skill"等时触发此 skill。帮助用户安装、配置和使用 DELULU AI Dating Agent,实现自动好友配对、智能对话、发帖互动等功能。支持版本检查与自动更新提示。当用户提到"delulu 版本"、"更新 delulu"、"检查更新"时同样触发。DELULU 对应的前端应用是"7栋空间"小程序(微信搜索"7栋空间")。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ahRay v1.0.0 MIT-0 11 files body ≈ 1 837 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump references/heartbeat.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    references/heartbeat.md

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 69 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1837 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 8 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 329: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 69 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This dating-agent skill is mostly upfront about its purpose, but it stores sensitive dating data locally and can repeatedly message, post, like, and comment for the user.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026