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FD openclaw-connect-node

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Scarlett_AI v1.0.10 MIT-0 28 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 854 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
19/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
31
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install-node.sh:143
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://rpm.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>/dev/null
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install-node.sh:154
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://rpm.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>/dev/null
Medium and low: 17
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install-node.sh:21
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    #     curl -sSL https://your-hub/install-node.sh | bash -s -- \
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install-node.sh:140
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>/dev/null
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install-node.sh:151
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>/dev/null
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use server/src/index.ts:1365
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    const res = await axios.put(`${resolvedHubUrl()}/api/collaborations/state/${key}`, req.body, {
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token frontend/package-lock.json:313
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…SzS+cfgl…B0A==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token frontend/package-lock.json:446
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…QYA+ISs0/2l3T9/kj42…aQT/dfNXWX/ZZCQ==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token frontend/package-lock.json:650
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha512-6+gjmF…uh8+uw3mnrvgs+dSPQ…dZG+D4garKg==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token frontend/package-lock.json:667
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…DUr+vOv8…A8A==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token frontend/package-lock.json:792
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha512-oGB+Uxlg…BKZ+GTy0…lih/NSHS…cSg==",
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process install-node.sh:377
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable "$SERVICE_NAME" 2>/dev/null
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:173
    Reads a .env file
    source .env
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token server/package-lock.json:76
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…cAz+ivBu…Lvw==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token server/package-lock.json:161
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…IxX/wd5n…MGF+pv6g…i2Z+Wnj9/KjGz…4Eg==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token server/package-lock.json:195
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…BQM/qZ3R+9TEU…es4+qu1b…BFA==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token server/package-lock.json:212
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha512-8mL/vh8q…uJP+ZcVY…AJW+m0Et…WzA==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token server/package-lock.json:229
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…NES+HiD4…TOe+/2rdn…PWn/r/aAw==",
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:142
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup npm start &

Files scanned: 28. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 854 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real OpenClaw worker node, but it needs Review because it persistently runs with high authority, exposes unauthenticated local management APIs, stores secrets plainly, and automatically uploads local OpenClaw workspace data to the Hub.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026