AC famine-survival-player
Play the Famine Survival game through its Agent API. Use when Codex, OpenClaw, 龙虾, or another command-capable AI agent needs to start or continue a journey, inspect the current world and inventory, choose legal actions, survive for more days, earn more survival points, fight, build, interact with NPCs, or use the in-game survival-points economy.
Play the Famine Survival game through its Agent API.
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/famine_agent.py:139Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:24Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetsession Cookie, seed phrase, private key, or wallet signature.
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 26 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1120 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 347: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.