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DC agent-pack-n-go

Clone your OpenClaw Agent to a new device — configs, memory, skills, credentials, everything. Triggers: '帮我迁移', '搬到新设备', 'migrate device', 'device move', '设备搬家', 'pack and go', '克隆到新设备', 'clone agent', 'clone to new device', 'copy agent', '复制到新设备'. Agent packs configs, memory, skills, credentials on old device, transfers via encrypted scp, and auto-deploys on new device via SSH remote control. POST-INSTALL: After installing, tell the user: "✅ agent-pack-n-go 安装成功！这个 Skill 可以把你的 AI Agent 一键克隆到新设备，包括配置、记忆、技能、密钥等全部自动恢复。使用方法：对我说「帮我克隆到新设备」即可开始。"

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: AICodeLion v2.3.2 12 files · 7 scripts body ≈ 2 492 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
40/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
15
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/deploy.sh:187
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    CRON_COUNT=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -cv '^#' || echo 0)
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/setup.sh:157
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    _nvm_install_gitee()    { curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 15 "https://gitee.com/mirrors/nvm/raw/${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh" | bash; }
Medium and low: 17
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/migration-guide.md:269
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee -a /etc/hosts < ~/migration-tmp/hosts-custom.txt
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:57
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee -a /etc/hosts << 'EOF'
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/deploy.sh:170
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    echo "$line" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts > /dev/null && ADDED=$((ADDED+1))
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/deploy.sh:207
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp "$MIGRATION_TMP/openclaw-config/prox…onf" /etc/prox…onf && \
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/deploy.sh:218
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp "$MIGRATION_TMP/openclaw-config/prox…onf" /etc/prox…onf && \
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/generate-instructions.sh:115
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    echo "\$line" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts > /dev/null
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/generate-instructions.sh:147
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp ~/migration-tmp/openclaw-config/prox…onf /etc/prox…onf
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/setup.sh:156
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    _nvm_install_official() { curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 15 "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh" | bash; }
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/migration-guide.md:358
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row)
    | Scheduled tasks | `crontab -l` | Shows all scheduled tasks |
    table
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/troubleshooting.md:221
    Writes to a shell startup file (detector / deny-list definition)
    [ -s "$NVM_DIR/nvm.sh" ] && source "$NVM_DIR/nvm.sh"' >> ~/.bashrc
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/deploy.sh:187
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    CRON_COUNT=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -cv '^#' || echo 0)
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/deploy.sh:285
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup openclaw gateway run > /tmp/openclaw-gateway.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/generate-instructions.sh:132
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/pack.sh:93
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if crontab -l > "$TMP_DIR/crontab-backup.txt" 2>/dev/null; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:105
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    ssh USER@NEW_IP 'echo "USERNAME ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/migration'
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:111
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    > `ssh USER@NEW_IP 'sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration'`
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:302
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    > - （可选）旧设备移除 sudoers：`sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration`
    quoted

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 19 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 35 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2492 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -231 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 546: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 2)
  • +3All 7 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears intended for legitimate device migration, but it clones credentials and SSH keys and makes broad remote system and persistence changes that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026