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AF safeagentdb

Sets up and maintains SafeAgentDB-style database safety infrastructure for AFK agentic development. Use when integrating isolated local, develop, preview, and production database workflows; configuring Supabase/Vercel/GitHub Actions previews; adding migration guardrails; packaging SafeAgentDB into a project; or adapting branch-safe database infrastructure to another stack.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Aidan Zarski v1.1.0 MIT-0 22 files body ≈ 2 336 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 35 h ago

Sets up and maintains SafeAgentDB-style database safety infrastructure for AFK agentic development.

As a process F 43/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: templates/.github/workflows/

ProcedureGitHubSupabaseDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
43/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: templates/.github/workflows/
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv templates/scripts/supabase/use-branch-env.ts:197
    Reads a .env file
    console.log(existsSync('.env.local') ? readFileSync('.env.local', 'utf8').match(pattern)?.[1] || '(not set)' : '(not set)');

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: templates/.github/workflows/

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: templates/.github/workflows/
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: templates/.github/workflows/
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
  • 85Steps. 78 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2336 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 375: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 78 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (8 of 8)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is coherent and not malicious, but it automates high-privilege database and deployment changes with some destructive preview-data operations that need careful review before use.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · 10 Jun 2026