AC aig-scanner
A.I.G Scanner — AI security scanning for infrastructure, AI tools / skills, AI Agents, and LLM jailbreak evaluation via Tencent Zhuque Lab AI-Infra-Guard. Uses built-in exec + Python script, no plugin required. Requires AIG_BASE_URL to be configured. Triggers on: scan AI service, AI vulnerability scan, scan AI infra, check CVE, audit AI service, scan MCP, scan skills, audit AI tools, scan agent, red-team LLM, jailbreak test, 扫描AI服务, 检查AI漏洞, 扫描AI工具, 检查MCP安全, 审计Agent, 越狱测试.
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/aig_client.py:36Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/aig_client.py:108High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)boundary = "----…210"
quoted
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "keywords" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "triggers"
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Failures and branches. 23 branches
- 100Steps. 86 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3177 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 476: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 27 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 86 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.