SKILLEMALL.ai

BB crispr-screen-analyzer

Process CRISPR screening data to identify essential genes and hit candidates. Performs quality control, statistical analysis (RRA), and hit calling for pooled CRISPR screens including viability screens and drug resistance/sensitivity studies.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: AIpoch v0.1.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 9 423 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, execution cost, running it twice

ProcedureData and analyticsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Execution cost w 6
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Bash Edit Grep

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 9423 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 9423 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 268 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -258 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 242: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 32 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 268 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a coherent local CRISPR screen analysis tool with ordinary dependency-hygiene caveats, not evidence of malicious behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026