SKILLEMALL.ai

DD fetch-archive-to-lexiang

Discover and fetch articles, videos, podcasts, and PDFs into standardized source packages, then orchestrate deduplicated Lexiang archival. 侦察和抓取文章、视频、播客与 PDF,生成标准来源工作包并编排乐享归档。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Hermes author: ajaxhe v4.1.0 MIT-0 23 files body ≈ 1 112 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceYouTubeMedia and videoWriting and documentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
50/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
34
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/fetch_article.py:159
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    real_cookies = Path(real_chrome_dir) / "Default" / "Cookies"
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/fetch_article.py:325
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    cookies = get_chrome_cookies_for_domain(domain)
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/youtube-video.md:29
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `--cookies-from-browser chrome`
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/fetch_article.py:14
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition)
    Reads cookies from Chrome's cookie database and injects them into a fresh
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/fetch_article.py:156
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    """Copy cookies from daily Chrome profile into the CDP profile."""
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/fetch_article.py:322
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (code comment)
    # Inject cookies from real Chrome for common Substack domains
    comment
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/yt_download_transcribe.py:366
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition)
    "--cookies-from-browser", default="chrome",
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/yt_download_transcribe.py:367
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    help="从哪个浏览器获取 cookies(默认 chrome,设为空字符串禁用)"
    quoted

Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 175 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • warning description-no-when neither description nor a "## When to Use" section says when to use the skill
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 37 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1112 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 175: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 37 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 8)
  • +3All 6 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill performs the promised archival workflow, but it also reuses browser sessions, extracts cookies, reads local tokens, and uploads content using external credentials in ways that deserve careful review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 15 Jul 2026