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CC camofox-default-browser

Advanced browser automation via Camoufox Firefox fork — handles anti-bot protection for authorized automation tasks

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Akmal Dirgantara v1.1.2 MIT-0 14 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 533 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Advanced browser automation via Camoufox Firefox fork — handles anti-bot protection for authorized automation tasks

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedurePlaywrightCloudflareSoftware developmentInfrastructureMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
67/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
61
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:150
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    - Crash telemetry is anonymized: no page content, cookies, tokens, IPs, or user data
Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc INSTALL.md:93
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export CAMOUFOX_EXECUTABLE=/root/.cache/camoufox/camoufox' >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host INSTALL.md:168
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    RUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash - \
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc INSTALL.md:297
    Writes to a shell startup file
    sed -i '/export CAMOUFOX_EXECUTABLE/d' ~/.bashrc
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process INSTALL.md:133
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup node server.js --port 9377 > /tmp/camofox-daemon.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process INSTALL.md:134
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    disown
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/startup.sh:15
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup node server.js --port 9377 > /tmp/camofox-daemon.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/startup.sh:16
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    disown
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SECURITY.md:31
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    Set file permissions 600 (owner only)        chmod 777 for convenience
    security skill
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SECURITY.md:165
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    apikey="sk-a…456"  # EXPOSED IN VERSION CONTROL

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2533 tokens
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 115: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a high-power anti-detection browser automation skill with cookie-session reuse and some under-scoped access controls, so it should go through Review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 30 Jul 2026