SKILLEMALL.ai

AD secretcodex

Generate creative code names and encode/decode secret messages using classic and sophisticated ciphers. Blends nostalgic decoder ring fun with modern cryptographic techniques. Includes Caesar, Vigenère, Polybius, Rail Fence, and hybrid methods. Provides keys for secure message sharing between trusted parties.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: AM v1.0.0 3 files body ≈ 4 715 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Obfuscation uni-mixed-script-word SKILL.md:425
      Word mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters (homoglyph obfuscation) (2 occurrences)
      Ciphertext: CAXTANTТXADXAKW

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4715 tokens
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 112 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -278 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 310: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 45 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 112 items
    • +4Has examples (26 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This appears to be an educational cipher and code-name skill with no disclosed executable behavior or sensitive access.
    LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026