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BC coinpilot-hyperliquid-copy-trade

Automate copy trading on Hyperliquid via Coinpilot to discover, investigate, and mirror top on-chain traders in real time with low execution latency. Runtime use requires a local credentials JSON that contains high-sensitivity secrets. Use only on a trusted local runtime when users explicitly request setup, lead discovery, subscription start/stop, risk updates, or performance checks. Github: https://github.com/coinpilot-labs/skills

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Alan Ng v1.0.7 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 3 052 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion

ProcedureGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
50
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:8
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Privy user ID, one primary wallet private key, and 9 follower wallet private
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:37
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - primary wallet private key
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/coinpilot.template.json:8
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      "address": "0xRE…ESS",
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/coinpilot.template.json:9
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      "privateKey": "0xRE…KEY",
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/coinpilot.template.json:14
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      "address": "0xRE…S_1",
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/coinpilot.template.json:20
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      "address": "0xRE…S_2",
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/coinpilot.template.json:26
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      "address": "0xRE…S_3",
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
    • 85Steps. 120 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3052 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 435: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 120 items
    • +4Has examples (0 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is a disclosed copy-trading tool, but it handles raw wallet private keys and can execute live trading actions without built-in confirmation safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026