SKILLEMALL.ai

CB browser-vm-setup

Run a browser-driving agent on a Linux VM — Xvfb, Chromium launch traps, egress cost tiers. Use when headless fails on your VM or Chromium dies on launch. Stops at any bot defence.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Alexandre Bloch v1.0.1 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 4 720 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Run a browser-driving agent on a Linux VM — Xvfb, Chromium launch traps, egress cost tiers.

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedurePlaywrightAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:195
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q openclaw-purge ) || \
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:196
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null; \
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:198
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      ) | crontab -
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:188
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      # it before running. Piping a remote script into sudo bash is the operator's call.
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:195
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q openclaw-purge ) || \
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:196
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null; \
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:201
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      crontab -l | grep -c openclaw-purge          # Output: 1
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:259
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | Files older than the retention window still on disk | cron never installed, or `crontab -l` was never checked | re-run the §8 block **including the verify and the probe** |
      tablesecurity skill

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4720 tokens
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 180: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a setup guide for running a browser agent on a VM, with sensitive behavior like sessions, screenshots, shell-capable dashboard access, and retention disclosed and scoped to user-controlled infrastructure.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Jul 2026