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FC xhs-mcp-installer

一键安装并启动小红书 MCP 服务（xiaohongshu-mcp）。当用户说"帮我安装小红书MCP"、"安装 xhs-mcp"、"配置小红书 MCP"、"帮我搞个小红书"、或提供 GitHub 链接 https://github.com/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp 时触发。自动检测系统、下载二进制、配置开机自启、启动服务。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: alexduming v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 008 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
29/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 20

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:116
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$PLIST"
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:158
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v watchdog; echo "*/5 * * * * $INSTALL_DIR/watchdog.sh") | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:129
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$XHS_PLIST"
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:191
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v watchdog; echo "*/5 * * * * ~/xiaohongshu-mcp/watchdog.sh") | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:310
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.xhs-mcp.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:311
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.xhs-mcp.plist
Medium and low: 14
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/install.sh:3
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    # 用法: bash <(curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp/main/scripts/install.sh)
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:92
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST="$HOME_DIR/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.xhs-mcp.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/install.sh:134
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv /tmp/xhs-mcp.service /etc/systemd/system/xhs-mcp.service
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:168
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    log "     macOS: launchctl unload/load $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.xhs-mcp.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:94
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    XHS_PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.xhs-mcp.plist"
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:136
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/xhs-mcp.service > /dev/null << 'EOFSYSTEMD'
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/install.sh:77
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./xhs-mcp-bin server --port $PORT > mcp.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/install.sh:136
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable xhs-mcp
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/install.sh:151
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./xhs-mcp-bin server --port $PORT >> mcp.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/install.sh:158
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v watchdog; echo "*/5 * * * * $INSTALL_DIR/watchdog.sh") | crontab -
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:77
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./xhs-mcp server --port 18060 > ~/xiaohongshu-mcp/mcp.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:154
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable xhs-mcp
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:177
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./xhs-mcp server --port $PORT >> ~/xiaohongshu-mcp/mcp.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:191
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v watchdog; echo "*/5 * * * * ~/xiaohongshu-mcp/watchdog.sh") | crontab -

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 4 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2008 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 175: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill installs the intended Xiaohongshu MCP service, but it also makes persistent system changes, can kill unrelated local processes, and handles browser cookies with weak safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026