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FD clawchat-p2p

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Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: alexrudloff v0.0.3 44 files body ≈ 899 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
0/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 35

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence REFERENCE.md:255
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    com.clawchat.daemon.plist > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawchat.daemon.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence REFERENCE.md:261
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawchat.daemon.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence REFERENCE.md:275
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawchat.daemon.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence REFERENCE.md:278
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawchat.daemon.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence REFERENCE.md:279
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawchat.daemon.plist
Medium and low: 30
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets QUICKSTART.md:28
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # SAVE THE SEED PHRASE - it's your only backup!
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:65
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - **Self-sovereign**: You control your identity through your seed phrase - no accounts, no servers, no gatekeepers
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:95
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # IMPORTANT: Save the seed phrase displayed - it's your only backup!
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets REFERENCE.md:72
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Back up your 24-word seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets REFERENCE.md:74
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **IMPORTANT**: Write down and securely store the seed phrase. It's the only way to recover your identity.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets REFERENCE.md:169
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    ### Recover from Seed Phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/keys.ts:89
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    /** BIP39 seed phrase (24 words) - MUST be backed up */
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/keys.ts:102
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Create new identity with generated seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/keys.ts:121
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Recover identity from existing seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/keys.ts:151
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Encrypt and save identity (including seed phrase)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/wallet.ts:45
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    /** The seed phrase (24 words) */
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/wallet.ts:52
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Generate a new 24-word BIP39 seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/wallet.ts:60
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Validate a BIP39 seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/wallet.ts:75
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Create wallet from seed phrase
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:128
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-GZMB+a0mO…4cw+w1WV…UED+1X8a…sJi+8mgpw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:298
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…HK5+NE/tvnRLbIqUWa+0E9N4WNMjmp/kXXP…R8w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:519
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…78O/B3Kkh+nKABUF++bvJv…56W+C8F9…X6m+IktJnIb1Jjg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:616
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…KTo+GgPF…Udd/d7su…Z5A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:732
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…5Ue/+tX+nmkg…wNx+ulArw==",
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/__tests__/identity.test.ts:80
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition; test fixture / example file)
    expect(isValidMnemonic('invalid seed phrase')).toBe(false);
    detectorfixture
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/__tests__/identity.test.ts:81
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    await expect(recoverIdentity('invalid seed phrase')).rejects.toThrow();
    fixturequoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/cli.ts:39
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .description('Create a new identity with fresh seed phrase')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/cli.ts:77
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    warning: 'SAVE YOUR SEED PHRASE! It cannot be recovered.',
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/cli.ts:83
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .description('Recover identity from existing seed phrase')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/cli.ts:86
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .option('--mnemonic <phrase>', 'BIP39 seed phrase (24 words)')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/cli.ts:87
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .option('--mnemonic-file <path>', 'Read seed phrase from file (recommended)')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/cli/gateway.ts:191
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log(`\n⚠️  IMPORTANT: Back up your seed phrase!`);
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/cli/gateway.ts:192
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log(`Seed phrase: ${identity.mnemonic}\n`);
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/crypto/noise.ts:10
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const PROTOCOL_NAME = 'Claw…256';
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/identity/wallet.ts:85
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    throw new Error('Seed phrase must be 24 words');
    quoted

Files scanned: 37. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 899 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
ClawChat appears to be a legitimate agent-to-agent chat tool, but its default remote access and wake behavior can let outside peers influence an OpenClaw agent too broadly.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026