SKILLEMALL.ai

BB usewhisper-autohook

Auto-hook tools for OpenClaw: query Whisper Context before every generation, ingest after every turn. Built for Telegram agents (stable user_id/session_id).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Alinxus v1.0.0 4 files body ≈ 1 202 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

GeneratorTelegramAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key usewhisper-autohook.mjs:11
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 3, column 14: description: Auto-hook tools for OpenClaw: query Whisper Context before every g… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1202 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 156: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears to do what it advertises, but it is built to automatically send and store full chat turns in an external memory service with limited user-control and privacy guidance.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026