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BC quiz-maker

出题工具。根据文档内容（docx、pdf、txt 等）生成选择题测试卷，并返回二维码供答题者扫码作答。触发词：出题、生成题目、创建测验、云端出题。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alsxie v1.4.1 MIT-0 19 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 437 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorWordInfrastructureLearningtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host deploy/deploy.sh:4
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash -
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key question_generator.js:5
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process deploy/deploy.sh:43
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable quiz-maker
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:33
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GLi+2W/6ao+6Y7gu/RCwR…Kng==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:79
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…dTg+QahU…hsw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:137
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FSj+bWLt…2sH/Kn8E…h6w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:390
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GLw+xYSd…cqA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:523
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FrF+LTRo…W3g==",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process start.sh:38
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup node server.js > "$LOG_DIR/server.log" 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 9 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 437 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 73: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This quiz skill matches its general purpose, but it sends document text to a hardcoded cloud host and exposes quiz/student records through weakly protected web/admin flows.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: malicious · 28 May 2026