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AB follow-builders-sidecar

OpenClaw-only sidecar for the original follow-builders skill. Use when the user wants to take over scheduling and delivery without modifying the upstream skill, configure digest delivery, inspect takeover status, or roll back to the original cron.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Amo v1.0.9 MIT-0 33 files body ≈ 1 654 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:48
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…rTX+BKBy…ADg+OQRj…dmB/ZFDCGAtSow==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 33. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 89 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1654 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -314 of 19 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 247: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 89 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This sidecar mostly does what it says, but it deserves review because it changes scheduled jobs, can post externally, and handles Feishu credentials with broader network behavior than the docs clearly scope.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026