SKILLEMALL.ai

AC ibkr-openclaw

Connect OpenClaw to Interactive Brokers via IB Gateway Docker. Live portfolio data, real-time quotes, historical K-lines, technical analysis, and Telegram alerts — all read-only safe. Use when users ask about IBKR integration, portfolio monitoring, stock analysis, or automated trading alerts.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Xinshen v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 492 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationDockerTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:31
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv install.sh:23
      Reads a .env file (code comment)
      # Copy .env template if .env doesn't exist
      comment

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1492 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 293: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is not overtly malicious, but it asks users to set up persistent live brokerage access with plaintext credentials while presenting the workflow as broadly read-only safe.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026