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DD polymarket-simmer-fastloop-sync-pulse

Trade Polymarket BTC/ETH/SOL 5-minute fast markets using a zero-delay Triple-Trigger strategy. Combines Binance momentum, NOFX OI/Netflow (free public API), and L2 Wall detection to choose between Trend Following and Mean Reversion. Pre-Caches market IDs to bypass the Simmer API blackout at market open.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: AndrewBrownrd v1.0.7 MIT-0 6 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 794 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Trade Polymarket BTC/ETH/SOL 5-minute fast markets using a zero-delay Triple-Trigger strategy.

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
71/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
65
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Broad scope
If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Broad scope meta-requests-env-secret SKILL.md:1
    Skill asks the runtime to inject credential env vars into its sandbox: SIMMER_API_KEY, WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY (high-value: WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY) — verify each one is needed for the stated purpose
    required_environment_variables: SIMMER_API_KEY, WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:14
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    External traders and agent operators use this skill to run or simulate automated Polymarket 5-minute market execution for BTC, ETH, and SOL. It supports paper-style runs without a wallet key and live
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: Live mode can place real Polymarket trades when a wallet private key is configured. <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:55
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | `WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY` | Optional | Your EVM wallet private key |
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets fastloop_improved.py:174
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    print(f"🔐 Wallet Private Key detected. Mode: {venue.upper()} (LIVE: {live})")
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets fastloop_improved.py:176
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    print(f"🍦 No Wallet Private Key. Mode: SIMULATION (Dry Run: {live})")
    quoted

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "pip"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1794 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 304: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real Polymarket trading bot, but it needs manual review because it can trade with a wallet key and its automation, persistence, and spend-limit controls are not fully or consistently disclosed.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026