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CF openclaw-checkpoint

Backup and restore OpenClaw workspace state and agents across machines using git. Enables disaster recovery by syncing SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, memory files, cron jobs, agents (~/.openclaw/agents/), and configuration to a remote repository. Use when user wants to checkpoint their OpenClaw state, restore on a new machine, migrate between computers, or protect against data loss. Provides commands checkpoint (help overview), checkpoint-setup (interactive onboarding), checkpoint-backup, checkpoint-restore (with interactive checkpoint selection or --latest for most recent), checkpoint-schedule (auto-backup), checkpoint-stop, checkpoint-status, checkpoint-init, and checkpoint-reset. Supports multi-agent backup with flags --workspace-only, --agents-only, and --agent <name>. Automatically backs up cron jobs to memory/cron-jobs-backup.json on each checkpoint-backup.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Anthony Francis v1.0.5 4 files body ≈ 5 643 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 43/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/setup.md

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
60/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
57
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
43/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/setup.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host INSTALL.md:22
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/main/scripts/install-openclaw-checkpoint.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:51
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/main/scripts/install-openclaw-checkpoint.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:89
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/main/scripts/install-openclaw-checkpoint.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:156
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **macOS**: Creates a launchd plist at `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.checkpoint.plist`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:48
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/main/scripts/install-openclaw-checkpoint.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:342
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/main/scripts/install-openclaw-checkpoint.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:508
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/main/scripts/install-openclaw-checkpoint.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:570
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **macOS**: Creates a launchd plist at `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.checkpoint.plist`
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:157
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Linux**: Adds a user-level cron job (visible via `crontab -l`)
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:491
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:571
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Linux**: Adds a user-level cron job (visible via `crontab -l`)
    quoted

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5643 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/setup.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/setup.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/setup.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 25 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5643 tokens
  • 100Steps. 161 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 864: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 55 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 161 items
  • +4Has examples (28 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s backup purpose is coherent, but its install and recovery docs repeatedly tell users to run an unverified remote installer directly in a shell.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026