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DC anysearch

Real-time search engine supporting web search, vertical domain search, parallel batch search, and URL content extraction.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: AnySearch v3.1.1 MIT-0 18 files · 6 scripts body ≈ 3 045 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Real-time search engine supporting web search, vertical domain search, parallel batch search, and URL content extraction.

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureSoftware developmentAI and agentsSales and CRMtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: anysearch (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README_zh.md:164
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File <skill_dir>/scripts/anys…ps1 doc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:164
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File <skill_dir>/scripts/anys…ps1 doc
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/anysearch_cli.js:13
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/anysearch_cli.py:50
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README_zh.md:109
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README_zh.md:206
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "Command: powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File <skill_dir>/scripts/anys…ps1" >> <skill_dir>/runtime.conf
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:109
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:206
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "Command: powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File <skill_dir>/scripts/anys…ps1" >> <skill_dir>/runtime.conf
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass scripts/anysearch_cli.ps1:571
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (detector / deny-list definition)
    $tpl = $tpl.Replace("{{LANG_INVOKE}}", "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/anys…ps1")
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass scripts/generate.py:146
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (detector / deny-list definition)
    $tpl = $tpl.Replace("{{LANG_INVOKE}}", "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/anys…ps1")
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:81
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (documentation table row)
    | PowerShell | `powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File <skill_dir>/scripts/anys…ps1 doc` |
    table
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:187
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (documentation table row)
    | PowerShell | `powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File <skill_dir>/scripts/anys…ps1 <command> [options]` |
    table

Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "authors"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "credentials"

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 25 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3045 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (24 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 121: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a disclosed search integration, but it asks agents to create third-party accounts with a real email and persist returned API keys in plaintext local files with uneven consent and warning language.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 2 Sept 2026