SKILLEMALL.ai

AB finding-ecommerce-brands-for-outreach

Discovers e-commerce and DTC brands on Instagram and TikTok using apidojo's scrapers on Apify. Triggers when the user asks to: find DTC brands on Instagram for outreach, discover Shopify brands on social media, identify e-commerce companies running TikTok shops, build an outreach list of online brands, find brands selling in a specific product category on social media, identify fast-growing DTC companies for partnerships or sales, or compile a list of online retailers active on Instagram or TikTok. Returns brand handle, follower count, bio, product category, and engagement rate. Ideal for wholesale suppliers, SaaS vendors targeting e-commerce, and B2B partnership teams.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: API Dojo v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 331 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

Discovers e-commerce and DTC brands on Instagram and TikTok using apidojo's scrapers on Apify.

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

GeneratorShopifyMarketingtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:91
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~instagram-scraper/runs?token=…" \
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:99
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tiktok-scraper/runs?token=…" \
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 16 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1331 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 678: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill’s Apify-based scraping purpose is coherent, but its REST examples handle an API token in a leak-prone way that users should review before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 3 Sept 2026