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BD imap-smtp-email

Read and send email via IMAP/SMTP. Check for new/unread messages, fetch content, search mailboxes, mark as read/unread, and send emails with attachments. Works with any IMAP/SMTP server including Gmail, Outlook, 163.com, vip.163.com, 126.com, vip.126.com, 188.com, and vip.188.com.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: apple133junjiang-a11y v1.1.0 11 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 431 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceGmailOutlookInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: imap-smtp-email (ClawHub)

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Secrets in code meta-credential-files .env
    Credential / dotenv files bundled with the skill (1)
    .env
Medium and low: 2
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv scripts/check-inbox.js:4
    Reads a .env file
    const env = fs.readFileSync('../.env', 'utf8');
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv scripts/test-conn.js:4
    Reads a .env file (test fixture / example file)
    const env = fs.readFileSync('../.env', 'utf8');
    fixture

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (imap-smtp-email) differs from the folder (imap-smtp-email-chinese)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 29 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1431 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 281: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This email skill appears purpose-aligned, but it gives an agent real mailbox read/send authority and has under-scoped credential, TLS, and local file handling risks that should be reviewed before use.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026