SKILLEMALL.ai

AB telegram-groupchat-setup

Configure a MoltBot agent to participate in a Telegram group chat. Automates adding the group to the allowlist, setting mention patterns, and configuring sender permissions — all via a single gateway config patch. Use when the user wants to set up their bot in a Telegram group, enable cross-bot communication, or configure group mention gating.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: arekqq v1.0.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 829 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice

IntegrationTelegramInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/detect_bot_info.sh:37
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      RESPONSE=$(curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/getMe")
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/detect_bot_info.sh:37
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      RESPONSE=$(curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/getMe")
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:56
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      gateway config and call `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getMe`.
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (telegram-groupchat-setup) differs from the folder (tg-groupchat-setup)
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 19 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 829 tokens
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 345: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill serves a legitimate Telegram setup task, but its helper script handles the bot token unsafely and could be tricked into running unintended local code.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026