SKILLEMALL.ai

BB agent-firewall

Real-time input/output filtering for agent communications. Block prompt injection, data exfiltration, and unauthorized commands before they reach the model.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Adnane Arharbi v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 655 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice

ReferenceAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Instruction override medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.

For the author

An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous index.js:145
    Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (detector / deny-list definition)
    message: 'Role confusion detected: Agent attempted to override system instructions.'
    detector

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 5 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 655 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 156: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a plausible firewall skill, but it needs review because it can retain or return raw sensitive content that users may expect it to block.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026