SKILLEMALL.ai

BF linear-webhook

Comment @mason or @eureka in Linear issues to dispatch tasks to agents. Webhook receives Linear comments and routes to correct agent.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Arnarsson v1.0.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 183 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 44/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: /automation/webhook

IntegrationLinearCloudflareAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
44/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: /automation/webhook
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:59
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example)
    # Note the public URL (e.g., https://abc-…com)
    demo
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:71
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    3. **URL:** `https://your-tunnel-url.trycloudflare.com/hooks/linear`
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:76
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    Note the public URL (e.g., `https://your-tunnel.trycloudflare.com`)
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:82
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    3. Set URL: `https://your-tunnel.trycloudflare.com/hooks/linear`
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:155
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - Verify tunnel is running: `curl https://your-tunnel.trycloudflare.com/hooks/linear`
    placeholder

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: /automation/webhook

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: /automation/webhook
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: /automation/webhook
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 85Steps. 55 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1183 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 133: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Linear webhook skill has a real automation purpose, but it mixes untrusted Linear content, local credential reads, and shell/JavaScript command execution in ways that require review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026