SKILLEMALL.ai

AC gtm-tools

Set up and call the gtm-tools API from any agent — get an API key (including fully autonomous self-registration), connect the browser-session pool, then use all 63 LinkedIn, Reddit, email-finding, buying-signal, and geocoding tools over Bash + curl. Use this skill whenever the user wants to install / set up / connect / onboard gtm-tools, asks how to get a gtm-tools API key, hits a 401 / 402 / "Unauthorized" / "Insufficient tokens" from api.gtm-tools.sh, asks what tools or what token costs are available, asks to check their token balance or top up, asks which LinkedIn or Reddit accounts are connected, asks to install the browser extension, or names any gtm-tools tool (get_linkedin_company_url, get_email, detect_signal, list_linkedin_company_employees, get_reddit_post, …) without a workflow skill already loaded. This is the base capability skill — for full drafting workflows use outbound-sales, linkedin-copywriter, or reddit-community-manager instead.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Arnaud Jeannin v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 1 715 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Set up and call the gtm-tools API from any agent — get an API key (including fully autonomous self-registration), connect the browser-session pool, then use…

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:77
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://api.gtm-tools.sh/extension/install.sh | bash
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use references/tools.md:3
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      Every tool is `POST https://api.gtm-tools.sh/api/v0/<tool_name>` with `Authorization: Bearer $GTM_TOOLS_API_KEY` and a JSON body. The same names are exposed over MCP at `https://api.gtm-tools.sh/mcp`.
      vendor-hostquoted

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 6 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1715 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 963: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is a real GTM API integration, but it gives agents broad account, billing, social-media, and session-backed authority without enough consent and scoping safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 26 Jul 2026