DD expanso-secrets-scan
(no description)
As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
-
high Secrets in code
secret-private-keyREADME.md:56Private key material (key header without key body)| `private_key` | -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header only
Medium and low: 4
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenREADME.md:67Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)apiKey: "sk-p…789",
-
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvpipeline-cli.yaml:8Reads a .env file (code comment)# cat .env.example | expanso-edge run pipeline-cli.yaml
comment -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalREADME.md:67Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)apiKey: "sk-p…789",
-
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalREADME.md:69Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)password: "supe…123!"
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Steps. 2 steps
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 184 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3No numbered steps or checklist
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 7 headings
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.