BC Iran Intelligence Radar
Monitor Persian-language X (Twitter) activity related to Iran, detect high-signal geopolitical events, translate posts, score escalation risk, and generate actionable intelligence reports with optional Telegram alerts and daily briefings.
As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
AnalyzerTelegramInfrastructureWriting and documentsData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlskills/persian_x_radar/telegram_alert.py:61Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"vendor-hostquoted
Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
name-formatname should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens) - warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "skill_id" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "price_per_call" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "capabilities" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "inputs" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "outputs" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "tools"
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Iran Intelligence Radar) differs from the folder (iran-intelligence-radar)
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 78 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1128 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 238: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 78 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its OSINT monitoring purpose, but it can automatically send scan results to external alert channels with limited consent and data-handling safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026